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Abstract—This paper investigates unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV)-aided jamming technique for enabling physical layer key-
less security in scenarios where the exact eavesdropper location
is unknown. We assume that the unknown eavesdropper location
is within an ellipse characterizing the coverage region of the
transmitter. By sequentially optimizing the transmit power, the
flight path of the UAV and its jamming power, we aim at
maximizing the average secrecy rate with arbitrary eavesdrop-
per location. Simulation results demonstrate that the optimal
flight path obtains better secrecy rate performance compared
to that using direct UAV flight path encasing the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver. Most importantly, even with the
unknown eavesdropper location, we obtained a secrecy rate that
is comparable to a scenario when the eavesdroppers location is
known. However, the average secrecy rate with the unknown
eavesdropper location varies depending on the proximity of the
eavesdropper to the known location of the transmitter. We also
observe that due to the UAV-aided jamming, the average secrecy
rate stabilizes at some point even though the average received
envelope power of the eavesdropper increases. This essentially
demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Secure communication, jamming, UAV, trajec-
tory optimization, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting sensitive or confidential information is of
paramount interest to most businesses/organizations pri-
vate, public, government, military or intelligence. In the
event that such data/information is made public, these busi-
nesses/organizations may face legal or financial ramifications.
At the very least, they will suffer loss of customer trust (e.g.
companies, etc.); but in the worst case, it could lead to the
complete annihilation of the organization (e.g. Military, etc.).
Thus, secure communications are obligatory to most busi-
nesses/organizations and in this sense seen as a primordial re-
quirement of technological and military exploits. However, as
technologies continue to explode, especially with the develop-
ment of modern computing technologies, the internet of things
(IoT), 5G and future generation networks, adverse robust ways
of information theft continue to grow [1], [2]. In practice,
a total secured communication is unattainable, nevertheless,
theories seem to support a measure that is acceptable [3], [4]. It
is important that communication be unique in all the layers of
the communication model - open system interconnection (OSI)
and/or the internet model to guarantee its security. Different
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protocols and techniques have been developed in the literature
for the security in the layers of these models [4]. Public
and private key-based cryptographic security measures are
most widely used in many communication systems. However,
cryptographic security is heavily computation demanding in
one hand, thus impractical in many IoT applications, and
subject to sophisticated external attacks with the advent of
modern computing facilities on the other hand. Developing
novel security measures to combat such attacks is therefore of
prime interest for many researchers. In this context, the notion
of physical layer security has attracted significant attention due
to its ability to provide information-theoretic security [4]–[7].
The physical layer is similar in most communication models
as it deals with processing the encapsulated message for
transmission via the channel [8]. In wireless communications,
it deals directly with the electromagnetic waves referred to
as signals. These signals can be compromised via eaves-
dropping and jamming of legitimate receivers. Focusing on
the eavesdropping, the security in the physical layer can be
subdivided into key-based and keyless security models. The
primary objective of both models is to reduce the ability of
an illegitimate user to gain access to the transmitted mes-
sage. While the key-based models use information obscurity
as its main tool, the keyless models detect the possible
information leak in the presence of eavesdropper(s)1 and
attempts to decrease its intercepted information. The degree
of information protection in a keyless physical layer security
model is measured as the secrecy capacity for delay tolerant
applications and the outage probability for delay intolerant
applications. To maximize the secrecy capacity, [3] proposed
an on/off algorithm that varies the power transmitted from the
source especially when the eavesdropper have better channel
quality. It relied on the principle that the source knows the
channel state of the eavesdropper based on inherent channel
monitoring. While this scheme reduces the information content
received by the legitimate receiver, it also has limited practical
applications as the channel information of the eavesdropper
is usually unknown. Instead of reducing the transmit power,
a more sophisticated approach could be to deliberately jam
the eavesdropper’s channel ensuring that it receives little/no
information. The major limitation of this technique is that
the eavesdropper will usually operate at the same band as
1The kind of eavesdroppers referred to in this paper are considered as
passive Wyner wiretappers [9] which do not attempt to alter the transmitted
message but try to overhear only.
2the legitimate receiver, hence the jamming will also affect
the legitimate receiver. A combination of jamming and power
variation, harnessing their gains is subsequently the bedrock
of modern signal jamming techniques.
Signal jamming as a physical layer protection strategy is
one of the most prominent brute-force methods of limiting the
information theft in keyless physical layer security exploiting
the fading characteristics of the channel [8]. It entails simul-
taneous transmission of a signal with similar characteristics
to the genuine signal but carrying no information content
to cause interference to the eavesdropper’s received signal.
Although this technique does not guarantee that there will be
no information leakage, similar to other security techniques,
it reduces the probability of successful interception thereby
increasing the secrecy capacity of the end-to-end communi-
cation. While jamming poses to be an effective technique for
improving secrecy, there are some critical issues that affect the
effectiveness of signal jamming:
(a) The degree of transmit power required to increase the
secrecy capacity without adversely degrading the infor-
mation content of the desired receiver,
(b) The transmitter’s responses to the knowledge of the pos-
sible eavesdropper(s),
(c) The optimal location to deliver the jamming signals from.
Researchers have since investigated these requirements in-
dependently as in [10], however, the investigation of the
collective effects of (a)-(c) is of practical interest due to
their inter-dependency in the context of secrecy performance.
While some recent studies affirm that this technique yields
improvement in the secrecy capacity, they are all based on
the impractical assumption that the eavesdropper(s’) location
is perfectly known at the transmitter [11].
With respect to the known remote eavesdropper location,
mobile means of delivering the jamming signals have recently
been investigated in the literature. One of the effective methods
proposed is the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in
scenarios where the nodes under consideration (the source,
the main receiver and the eavesdropper) are all based on the
ground. This is primarily due to its aerial radio visibility of
the ground terminals, its cost efficiency and its availability for
low-range applications. The applications of UAVs in commu-
nications range from their use as aerial base stations [12]–[14],
as relay nodes [15], as access/user nodes [11], [12] to channel
estimation [16], etc. Recently, with the advancement of the
internet of things (IoT), network of UAVs for UAV-to-UAV
communications as well as for general data transmission has
also been considered [17].
More recently, UAVs have been deployed for assisting in
secure communications between ground terminals [18], [19],
and to act as both relay nodes and security agents between
ground terminals [20]. In [21], the UAV is deployed with two
opposing roles namely, to establish favorable and degraded
channels for the legitimate and the eavesdropping links, re-
spectively. A separate jammer UAV has been considered in
[22] to degrade the eavesdropping channel in addition to the
cooperative UAV for the legitimate channel. Subsequently,
UAVs have also been used to deliver classified messages to
ground terminals amidst the constraints of eavesdroppers and
no-fly regions in [23]. Critical examination reveals that the
methods used in [18]–[23] are similar in principle since they
optimized the transmitted power, the UAV jamming power
and its trajectory for the corresponding scenarios. However,
a strong assumption made in [18]–[23] is that the location of
the eavesdropper(s) is known to the source and/or the UAV(s).
Although this assumption simplifies the respective problem
in each scenario, it is grossly impractical. In most practical
communication scenarios, even knowing the presence of an
eavesdropper is often very difficult let alone knowing their
exact locations or channel state information (CSI). This practi-
cal challenge motivates us to investigate secret communication
with unknown eavesdropper location in this paper. We consider
UAV-aided jamming technique for proactively degrading the
eavesdropping channel at unknown ground point for improving
the achievable secrecy rate.
An attempt to introduce eavesdropper obscurity has also
been made by Miao Cui, et al. in [24]. The authors in [24]
considered the UAV as the information source and optimized
its trajectory and transmitting power to a legitimate receiver
amidst a group of eavesdroppers located within an independent
small uncertainty region. The trajectory of the UAV has been
optimized to find the best points in the space to deliver the
maximum information to the legitimate receiver while the
eavesdroppers receive minimum information. In contrast, we
consider the UAV with an opposing role in this paper to
degrade the eavesdropper’s channel via cooperative jamming.
Note that our work differs from [24] not just in terms of the
UAV’s role, but also in terms of guaranteed secrecy perfor-
mance. In fact, the achievable secrecy performance in [24]
cannot be guaranteed as the uncertainty region expands and
overlaps with the certainty region of the legitimate receiver.
Furthermore, a network of legitimate and illegitimate UAVs
has been considered in [25] in which a UAV acts as the base
station to transmit signal to other legitimate UAVs in altitude
and the eavesdropper UAVs from unknown locations try to
overhear the signal. The secrecy outage probability and the
average secrecy rate performance have been analyzed. Since
all the nodes are at the same altitude, the gains of aerial
visibility of UAV was subdued. In this work, we intend to
explore this opportunity for ground nodes (source, legitimate
receiver and eavesdropper) in order to maximize the benefits of
aerial visibility of the UAV while constrained by the properties
of ground propagation.
We formulate the problem of maximizing the average se-
crecy rate under the unknown eavesdropper location assump-
tion by jointly optimizing the source transmit power, the UAV
trajectory and its jamming power. The problem is strictly non-
convex due to the correlation of the optimization variables
in the problem. Therefore, in this work, we sequentially
optimize the flight path of a UAV, its jamming power and
the transmitted power by the source node to ensure secure
communication in the considered scenario. One set of variables
are optimized in each step while keeping the others fixed. The
main contributions in this paper can be summarized as:
(a) Developing the mathematical analysis of UAV-aided jam-
ming applications to secure wireless communication when
the location of the eavesdropper is completely unknown.
3(b) Applying the block coordinate descent method and suc-
cessive convex approximation (SCA) technique with the
aid of the first-order Taylor series expansion.
(c) Unveiling the influence of the unknown eavesdropper’s
received power on the average secrecy rate between the
source and the legitimate receiver.
(d) Validating the formulations and the solutions by demon-
strating the performance of the proposed algorithm against
existing UAV-aided secure communication schemes
through extensive numerical simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes the UAV-aided communication system model and
the problem formulation. The proposed solution is developed
in Section III. Simulation results are presented in Section IV
before making the concluding remarks in Section V.
Figure 1. UAV-aided jamming for secure communication.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a secure wireless communication scenario
between a base station (BS) acting as a transmitting source
(Alice) located at an a-priori known ground point2 wa =
[xa,ya,0]
T and a receiver (Bob) at an a-priori known ground
point wb = [xb,yb,0]
T as shown in Fig. 1. However, an
eavesdropper (Eve) lurks around the area in an unknown
ground location, w˜e = [x˜e, y˜e, 0]
T , but within the area where
the wireless signal can be received. We denote the complex
block-fading channels of Alice with Bob and Eve as gb and
ge, respectively. Since Eve’s location is unknown, Alice’s
transmission power Pa is a function of Bob’s channel power
gain hb = |gb|
2 alone; hence Pa = P (hb), i.e. Alice varies her
transmission power depending on the channel state of Bob.
The average secrecy rate and secrecy capacity derived from
Shannon’s information content are given respectively as [3]
Rs =
∫
∞
0
∫ hb
0
[log2(1 + hbP (hb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rate of Bob
− log2(1 + heP (hb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rate of Eve
]+
× f(hb)f(he)dhedhb, (1)
2z-coordinate represents the altitude and the ground point is located at z=0.
Cs = max
P (hb)
Rs (2)
where Rs, Cs, P (hb), hb and he = |ge|
2 are the average
secrecy rate, secrecy capacity, transmit power from Alice, the
channel power gain of Bob and Eve, respectively, and [a]+
indicates max(0, a) 3. Note that [·]+ imposes a constraint
such that Eve cannot receive higher information than Bob at
any time during the communication. Accordingly, the limits
of the integrals in (1) are defined such that when he ≥ hb, the
mutual information between Alice and Eve is upper-bounded
by log2(1+hbP (hb)). The objective of keyless physical layer
security is to ensure that (2) is sustained at its optimal value
over the duration of the communication.
Note that the achievable secrecy rate in (1) describes the
secrecy rate as the difference of the average information rates
of Bob and Eve over all fading realizations of Bob and Eve.
The non-negativity assumption on the secrecy rate [·]+ requires
that the location of Eve revolves around that of Bob and not
beyond the coverage region of Alice. However, in practice,
Eve may even be located at positions closer to Alice than Bob
and thereby receive stronger signals than Bob assuming they
both share the same channel model based on the proximity to
the transmitter alone. In such scenarios, the achievable secrecy
rate would be zero.
To ameliorate the aforementioned challenge, we deploy a
UAV that will deliver jamming signals to reduce the informa-
tion acquired by Eve while attempting to sustain that obtained
by Bob. However, in UAV-aided communications, a common
challenge is to optimize the UAV trajectory [12]. In secure
communications, the challenge is further proliferated by the
unknown eavesdropper location. We aim at addressing this
challenge in the following sections. The UAV flight path will
be optimized to ensure that for any location of Eve within
the coverage region of Alice, its information rate will be
continually below that of Bob, thereby, achieving positive
secrecy rates.
We assume that the UAV is not equipped with any tracking
devices. Therefore, the UAV will not be able to locate or track
Eve despite having a clear line-of-sight (LoS) to all points
within the coverage region of Alice due to aerial visibility.
Furthermore, if the UAV flies horizontally at constant alti-
tude from an initial point q0 to a final point qf , its ascent and
descent flight path to the initial and final ground points can be
neglected. The UAV flight duration, T , is sampled at discrete
time-stamps of N equal time slots with duration of δ = T/N
[15], [18]. With large number of time slots N , we can assume
that the UAV maintains constant speed V m/s within a slot δ
and transmits almost continuously. For simplicity, we assume
that V is constant over the entire flight duration as also as-
sumed in [18]. If the distance covered in each sample is small
enough, we can assume that the UAV is stationary at each
sample point. Considering a large number of sample points, the
UAV is assumed to send jamming signal continuously. These
sampled points can be denoted as q[n] =
[
x[n], y[n], z[n]
]T
,
n ∈ {1, ..., N}, which satisfies the following constraints:
3Nota bene: All logarithms used in this work is of base 2 since we refer
to digital communications.
4‖q[n+ 1]− q[n]‖2 ≤ (V δ)2 (3a)
‖q[1]− q0‖
2 ≤ (V δ)2 (3b)
q[N ] = qf (3c)
‖q[n]−wa‖+ ‖q[n]−wb‖ ≤ 2a (3d)
q(xn, yn, zn) = q(xn, yn, H). (3e)
Inequalities (3a) and (3b) ensure that the distance covered
by the UAV within the flight samples does not exceed the
parametric distance. The velocity V m/s is chosen such that
the total distance covered by the UAV through the samples will
be greater than or equal to the Euclidean distance between q0
and qf , i.e., (V δ) ≥ ‖qf − qo‖, otherwise the system will
be intractable. This ensures that the UAV travels at least in
a straight path from its initial to its final points for a given
total flight duration. The equality in (3c) ensures that the final
flight point of the UAV is at the a-priori final destination,
while (3d) allows the UAV to remain within the uncertainty
region where the eavesdropper can be found. This region is
postulated as an ellipse and physically represents a cellular
coverage region of Alice. a determines the size of the ellipse
and satisfies {for a > ‖wb − wa‖}, wa and wb are the two
foci of the ellipse, ensuring that Bob is not a cell-edge user.
Finally, (3e) places the UAV to fly at constant altitude denoted
by H meters.
Assuming the ground fading channel between Alice and
Bob is Rayleigh distributed, the lower bound of the channel
power gain (corresponding to the worst channel condition)
with the jamming signal delivered by the UAV is given by
4 as obtained in [21], [19], [22]. We note that 4 is the upper
bound of the random complex channel gb [21].
hb[n] =
ground channel gain︷ ︸︸ ︷
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βod
−2
qb [n] + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
LoS jamming signal attenuation
, (4)
where ψ is the ground path loss component between Alice
and Bob, β0 represents the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at
a reference distance (d0 = 1)m of the ground channels,
dab and dqb are the Euclidean distance between Alice, UAV
and Bob respectively and Pu is the UAV jamming signal
power. To ensure that the power levels of the commu-
nication is within acceptable range, Pu and Pa are sub-
jected to average and peak power constraints described as:
0 ≤ Pu[n] ≤ Pumax (5a)
1
N
N∑
n=1
Pu[n] ≤ P¯ub (5b)
0 ≤ Pa[n] ≤ Pamax (5c)
1
N
N∑
n=1
Pa[n] ≤ P¯ab. (5d)
A. Problem Formulation
Let Q = {q[n], n ∈ N}, pa = {Pa[n], n ∈ N}, and
pu = {Pu[n], n ∈ N} be the set of UAV sample points
(representing its trajectory when connected by a straight line),
the set of power transmitted by Alice as well as the UAV,
respectively. We aim at solving (2) by alternatingly optimizing
Q, pa and pu. Using Reimann sum and averaging through all
fading realizations of hb, we approximate (1) to obtain
Rs =
1
N
N∑
n=1
∫ hb[n]
0
[log(1 + hb[n]Pa[n]
− log(1 + he[n]Pa[n]]f(he)dhe. (6)
To solve (6), we need to know the possible distribution of the
fading channel of Eve which can be obtained by historical
measurements collected over the region covered by Alice
(represented in this model as an ellipsis as in (3d)). Using the
Rayleigh fading realization assumption, we have its squared
envelop as
f(he) =
1
ye
e−
he[n]
ye , (7)
where ye is the average received envelop power of Eve and can
be obtained via measurements and/or estimations. Substituting
(7) in (6) and solving the integral, we obtain
Rs =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log(1 + hb[n]Pa[n])︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rate of Bob
−
∫ hb[n]
0
Pa[n]e
−
he[n]
ye
1 + he[n]Pa[n]
dhe︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rate of Eve
. (8)
The secrecy rate in (8) can be further simplified as [26, eq.
3.352.1]
Rs =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log(1 + hb[n]Pa[n])
− e
1
yePa[n]
[
Ei
(
−
hb[n]
ye
−
1
yePa[n]
)
−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
, (9)
where
Ei(x) =
∫
∞
x
e−t
t
dt
is the exponential integral. We note that (8) is equivalent
to (9) and they can be used interchangeably depending on
the parameter been inferred. Thus we substitute the objective
5function in (2) with the elaborated form in (9) to obtain the
following optimization problem4
(P1) : max
pa,pu,Q
N∑
n=1
log(1 + hb[n]Pa[n])
− e
1
yePa[n]
[
Ei
(
−
hb[n]
ye
−
1
yePa[n]
)
−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
(10a)
s.t. ‖q[n+ 1]− q[n]‖2 ≤ (V δ)2 (10b)
‖q[1]− q0‖
2 ≤ (V δ)2 (10c)
q[N ] = qf (10d)
‖q[n]−wa‖+ ‖q[n]−wb‖ ≤ 2a (10e)
q(xn, yn, zn) = q(xn, yn, H), (10f)
0 ≤ Pu[n] ≤ Pumax (10g)
1
N
N∑
n=1
Pu[n] ≤ P¯ub (10h)
0 ≤ Pa[n] ≤ Pamax (10i)
1
N
N∑
n=1
Pa[n] ≤ P¯ab. (10j)
Problem (P1) entails that the secrecy capacity of the proposed
system depends on the optimal transmission power of Alice,
the jamming power delivered by the UAV and the UAV loca-
tion. Unfortunately, (P1) is a non-convex optimization problem
with respect to the optimization variables (pa,pu,Q) and
cannot be easily solved directly. However, using a sequential
and iterative technique under a block coordinate approach, we
can obtain suboptimal solutions that satisfy the constraints in
(3) and (5).
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
We propose solving the non-convex problem (P1) in an
alternating fashion. The proposed solution involves decompos-
ing the original problem (P1) into three sub-problems each
characterizing a set of optimization variables. In each sub-
problem, we optimize one set of variables while fixing the
other variables in each iteration. The results obtained from
each iteration step are analyzed with the objective value of
(P1) and the iteration stops at the point when the objective
value (P1) converges.
A. Optimizing the Source Power (Pa)
We first optimize Alice’s transmit power for arbitrary initial
trajectory and jamming power. Replacing the objective in
4We neglected the constant scaling factor 1
N
in the objective function as
this does not affect the optimal solution.
problem (P1) with (8), problem (P1) can be reformulated for
any given Q and pu as problem (P2):
(P2) : max
pa
N∑
n=1
log(1 + hb[n]Pa[n])
−
∫ hb[n]
0
Pa[n]e
−
he[n]
ye
1 + he[n]Pa[n]
dhe (11a)
s.t. (5c) and (5d). (11b)
Note that problem (P2) is still non-convex over the entire
domain of pa. However, for the region under peak and average
power constraints, the objective can be shown to be the sum
of a concave and a convex functions. The proof is relegated
to Appendix A.
Since the objective function of problem (P2) is differentiable
(as demonstrated in Appendix A), it can be solved using
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for non-convex
problems [27]:
∇f0(x
∗) + λ∗∇fn(x
∗) = 0, (12a)
λ∗fn(x
∗) = 0, (12b)
where f0 is the objective in problem (P2), fn are the con-
straints in (5c) and (5d) and x∗ is the optimal value of Pa.
Simultaneously solving (12) using [26, eq. 0.410 and 3.462.17]
respectively, we obtain
−
[
hb[n]
1 + hb[n]Pa[n]
−
1
ye(Pa[n])2
e
1
yePa[n][
Γ
(
−1,
1
yePa[n]
)
− Γ
(
−1,
hb[n]
ye
+
1
yePa[n]
)]]
×
N∑
n=1
Pa[n]−
1
N
P¯ab = 0, (13)
where Γ(−i, z) = (−1)
i
i! (E1(z)− e
−z
∑i−1
k=0
(−1)kk!
zk+1
) [28, eq.
8.4.15]). Solving (13) with a non-linear solver produces the
suboptimal values of Pa.
B. Optimizing the UAV Jamming Power (Pu)
To optimize the jamming power pu delivered by the UAV,
we consider pu as the optimization variable while fixing the
values of pa and Q. Problem (P1) is then reformulated
while substituting for hb[n] as
(P3) : max
pu
N∑
n=1
log
(
1 +
βod
−ψ
ab Pa[n]
Pu[n]βod
−2
qb [n] + 1
)
−e
1
yePa[n]×

Ei

−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βod
−2
qb
[n]+1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]


−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
(14a)
s.t. (5a) and (5b). (14b)
Under the constraints, the objective of Problem (P3) is a non-
convex function with respect to pu due to the non-convexity
of the information rate of the Eve. However, the information
6rate of Bob is concave with respect to pu. Hence, problem
(P3) is solved using successive convex approximation (SCA).
Given an initial UAV jamming power in the k-th iteration
as pku = {P
k
u [n], n ∈ N}; we have using first order Taylor
expansion that
e
1
yePa[n]

Ei

−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βod
−2
qb
[n]+1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]


−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
≤ Gk[n] + Tk[n](Pu[n]− P
k
u [n]),
(15)
where
Gk[n] = e
1
yePa[n]

Ei

−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pku [n]βod
−2
qb
[n]+1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]


−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
and Tk[n] =
Pa[n]β
2
od
−ψ
ab
d
−2
qb
[n]e
−(
βod
−ψ
ab
yeβod
−2
qb
[n]Pku [n]+ye
)
(βod
−2
qb
[n]Pku [n]+1)(Pa[n]βod
−ψ
ab
+βod
−2
qb
[n]Pku [n]+1)
.
Taking only the non-constant terms in (15), problem (P3) can
be reformulated as
(P3b) : max
pu
N∑
n=1
[
log
(
1 +
βod
−ψ
ab Pa[n]
Pu[n]βod
−2
qb [n] + 1
)
−Tk[n]Pu[n]] (16a)
s.t. (5a) and (5b). (16b)
Problem (P3b) is a convex problem within the constrained re-
gion and can be efficiently solved using interior-point method
or a convex solver such as CVX [29], [30].
C. Optimizing the UAV Trajectory (Q)
In this sub-problem, the problem (P1) is recast to ensure
that only the UAV trajectory, Q is the optimization parameter.
However, the reformulated problem is non-convex in Q.
Hence, to reduce computational complexity, we introduce a
slack variable M = {m[n] = ‖q[n]−wb‖
2, n ∈ N} such that
d−2qb [n] =
1
m[n] . Thus we obtain the following optimization
problem:
(P4) : max
Q,M
m
N∑
n=1
log

1 + βod−ψab Pa[n]
Pu[n]βo
m[n] + 1

− e 1yePa[n]
×

Ei

−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βo
m[n] +1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]


−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
(17a)
s.t. m[n]− ‖q[n]− wb‖
2 ≤ 0, (17b)
and (3). (17c)
Due to the non-convexity of problem (P4) with respect to the
trajectory, q[n], we reformulate the problem using successive
approximation with the first order Taylor expansion. Let
Qk[n] = {q
k[n], n ∈ N} denote the initial UAV trajectory
for the kth iteration. Then the objective function of problem
(P4) can be rewritten as
e
1
yePa[n]

Ei

−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βo
m[n] +1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]
)− Ei(−
1
yePa[n]




≤ Ok[n] +Wk[n](q[n]− q
k[n]) (18)
−‖q[n]− wb‖
2 ≤ Sk[n], (19)
where
Ok[n] = e
1
yePa[n]

Ei

−
βod
−ψ
ab
Pu[n]βo
mk[n]
+1
ye
−
1
yePa[n]


−Ei
(
−
1
yePa[n]
)]
Wk[n] =
β2od
−ψ
ab Pu[n]e
−
βod
−ψ
ab
ye
(
1+ βoPu[n]
mk[n]
)
ye
(
− 1
yePa[n]
−
βod
−ψ
ab
ye
(
1+ βoPu[n]
mk[n]
)
)(
1 + βoPu[n]
mk[n]
)
m2k[n]
,
and Sk[n] = ‖qk[n]‖
2 − 2[qk[n] − wb]
T q[n] − ‖wb‖
2. Under
similar conditions as of problem (P3), (P4) can be reformu-
lated as
(P4b) : max
Q,M
N∑
n=1
log

1 + βod−ψab Pa[n]
Pu[n]βo
m[n] + 1

−Wk[n]m[n]
(20a)
s.t. m[n] + Sk[n] ≤ 0, (20b)
and (3). (20c)
Problem (P4b) is a convex problem in Q under the specified
constraints and can be solved using interior-point methods
or with a convex solver. The overall procedure has been
summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Iterative algorithm for solving pa, pu, and Q
1: Initialize pu and Q such that the constraints in (5a), (5b)
and (3) are satisfied.
2: m← 1.
3: repeat
4: Compute and update pa in (13) with given pu and Q.
5: Using updated pa and current Q, solve (16) for pu.
6: With given pa and pu, find Q by solving problem (20).
7: Compute Rs as defined in (9).
8: e =
Rnews −R
old
s
Rnews
.
9: m← m+ 1.
10: until e < θ OR m ≥ mmax.
11: Output: pa, pu, and Q.
7IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed solution approach through numerical simulations. We
implement the solution discussed in Section III following
the procedure described in Algorithm 1. The optimization
parameters are initialized by solving the feasibility problem
such that the the initial values just satisfy their respective
constraints. The feasibility problem can be formulated by
setting the objective of problem (10) to zero, with all the
primary constraints unchanged. Then, by iteratively optimizing
each parameter with the knowledge of the others, we obtain
the suboptimal solution to problem (P1) when the error (e)
between steps is less than θ (where θ = 10−5) or the maximum
number of iterations is reached (where mmax = 200).
Similar to the convergence analysis in [19], Algorithm 1
is guaranteed to converge for all feasible initial points. This
is shown in Fig. 2 where a fast convergence is observed for
different scenarios of the UAV flight time. In Fig. 2, the ProW
algorithm represents the proposed solution to the unknown
Eve problem while the associated numbers represent the UAV
flight time. In all the simulations, we used the parameters as
described in Table I unless otherwise specified.
Table I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Simulation parameter Symbol Value
Alice location wa [0, 0, 0]
Bob location wb [300, 0, 0]
Eve location we [150, 250, 0], [350, 0, 0],
[300, 20, 0], [300, 70, 0]
Initial UAV location qo [−100, 100, H]
Final UAV location qf [500, 100, H]
UAV height(when fixed) H 100m [18]
Velocity per sample(when
fixed)
V 3m/s [18]
Duration per sample(when
fixed)
δ 0.5s [18]
Signal-to-noise ratio βo 90dB [18]
Average received envelop
power
ye 20dBm
Average UAV transmit
power
P¯ub 10dBm [18]
Maximum UAV power Pumax 4Pub [18]
Average Source power P¯ab 30dBm [18]
Maximum source power Pamax 36dBm [18]
Radius of uncertainty re-
gion (when fixed)
a 450m
Path loss for ground com-
munication (urban area
cellular radio)
u 3.4
We then analyze the secrecy rate performance of the pro-
posed scheme as compared with the existing schemes. In
Fig. 3, the performance of the unknown Eve location scenario
using the proposed joint trajectory and power optimization
algorithm (referred to as ProW) is compared the known Eve
location scenario considered in [18] (referred to as JT&P).
We also compare the performance with the baseline scheme
without optimizing the UAV trajectory referred to as Straight),
in which the UAV flies straight to the location above the
eavesdropper. The associated numbers in the legends represent
the respective Euclidean distances from Alice (source) to Bob
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Figure 2. Convergence performance of Algorithm 1.
for the ProW algorithm (recall unknown Eve location) and
from Alice to Eve for the JT&P algorithm based on the
locations specified in Table I. Nevertheless, from Fig. 4 to
Fig. 8, the numbers attached to the acronyms depict the UAV
flight time in seconds. Results in Fig. 3 illustrate that the direct
flight path with constant power (Straight) scheme performs the
worst in terms of the average secrecy rate. Due to the jamming
signals delivered by the UAV, the average secrecy rate of the
JT&P scheme is zero when the Eve is at the same location as
Bob. As Eve moves away from Bob, the average secrecy rate
increases since the UAV locates Eve and stays at an optimum
location to jam her signal. Nevertheless, since the location of
Eve is unknown (as in ProW 300), the average secrecy rate
is shown to be close to the JT&P scheme when Eve is closer
to Alice and is supposed to receive more information content
without the UAV jamming. However, considering that ProW
300 is near to a practical scenario, this marginal decrease in
performance may be considered as the near practical trade-off
to the scheme.
Also, it is important to note that the information rate of
both Bob and Eve is affected by the jamming signal of the
UAV. However, Eve is affected more, even when it has better
channel condition (measured in terms of its average received
envelope power), as the UAV regularly finds paths such that
it stays further from Bob and estimates as close to Eve as
possible until it flies to its final point. This allows for positive
average secrecy rates shown in Fig. 3.
The flight trajectory of the UAV with respect to Alice and
Bob is shown in Fig. 4. The 2D plot shows that from an aerial
view, the trajectory of the UAV follows a given pattern bound
by the uncertainty region of Eve (ellipse) provided it flies at
a constant altitude. However, to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed approach in practice, we also plot a 3D view
of the trajectory in Fig. 4. The 3D plot shows that the UAV
trajectory moves towards the opposite of Bob while ensuring
that the jamming signal is still delivered to all points within
the constrained region of Eve.
Furthermore, Fig. 5 examines the constraints posed by the
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Figure 3. Average secrecy rate with ‘unknown’ as well as ‘known’ eaves-
dropper locations, and direct UAV flight path.
Figure 4. UAV flight trajectory in 2D and 3D view while Eve location is
unknown (For clarity, we use δ = 10).
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Figure 5. Effect of average received envelop power of Eve on average secrecy
rate.
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Figure 6. Influence of UAV altitude (height) on average secrecy rate under
the proposed scheme.
assumptions on the property of Eve’s channel. We recall that
the only known property of Eve is its average received envelop
power, ye. Hence Fig. 5 presents the effect of varying ye on
the average secrecy rate. It can be observed that increase in ye
decreases the average secrecy rate via a positive exponential
path. Hence, for large values of ye characterizing Eve having
better reception equipment and channel state as compared to
Bob, the decrement in average secrecy rate with respect to
increasing ye becomes negligible. The optimized UAV path
ensures that even when the location of Eve is unknown, the
average secrecy rate of the communication between Alice
and Bob can be guaranteed despite Eve supposedly receiving
signals with high envelope power. While this average secrecy
rate is low, it can be improved by increasing the time of
flight of the UAV or allowing the UAV to fly throughout the
communication duration as shown in Figs. 3 and 5.
Other factors that affect the average secrecy rate in the
considered scenario of unknown eavesdropper location include
the UAV height and speed, and the SNR of the environment.
Figs. 6, 7 and 8 show the average secrecy rate of the proposed
system compared to the UAV altitude, speed and ground node
SNR, respectively. It can be observed that the impact of flying
the UAV at higher altitude is minimal in terms of average
secrecy rate, compared to allowing it to fly at longer duration.
The trend in Fig. 6 suggests that the average secrecy rate
increases with increase in the UAV altitude/height. However,
we observed from our simulations that for large values of
UAV flight altitude, the trajectory optimization problem (P4)
becomes infeasible. Increasing the UAV speed and ground
nodes SNR tend to increase the average secrecy rate with a
logarithmic path. Nevertheless, the rate of increase is higher
with the UAV speed than the SNR. As the UAV speed
increases, its sample points increase allowing it to deliver more
jamming signal to Eve within its flight time. Similar to results
observed in [25], increasing the ground SNR improves the
secrecy, however, this parameter is subject to characteristics
of the outdoor environment which cannot be easily controlled.
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The optimized transmitting power of Alice (Pa) and the
optimized UAV jamming power (Pu) are plotted in Fig. 9.
While Alice transmits at its maximum power when the UAV
is close to Bob, the UAV transmits minimum jamming signal.
This ensures that the UAV interference to Bob is minimal and
Bob continues to receive the information sent by Alice.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have exploited UAV-aided jamming tech-
nique in reducing the information rate received by an eaves-
dropper in an unknown location. We solved the achievable
secrecy rate maximization problem using sequential block
coordinate optimization method. While we were constrained
by the elusive nature of the eavesdropper location, we obtained
a secrecy rate that is comparable to a scenario when the
eavesdropper’s location is known. We also showed that the
UAV speed and flight duration are amongst the main parame-
ters to consider while using UAV to increase physical layer
security. Most importantly, we have demonstrated that the
average received envelope power of the eavesdropper cannot
guarantee better information content as the secrecy rate tends
to stabilize with large envelope power. We propose that future
works investigate predicting the eavesdropper location with
the aid of deep learning techniques in order to update the
UAV flight path in real-time. This could reduce the latency
in continuously solving the optimization problem for each
communication block.
APPENDIX A
In this section, we show that the non-convexity of (8) is
the sum of a concave and a convex functions in terms of Pa.
From (8), we obtain
Rs =
N∑
n=1
log(1 + hb[n]Pa[n])︸ ︷︷ ︸
f1(Pa)
−
∫ hb[n]
0
Pa[n]e
−
he[n]
ye
1 + he[n]Pa[n]
dhe︸ ︷︷ ︸
f2(Pa)
. (21)
We consider (21) in two parts, showing their convexity with
the second derivative method. In general, the convexity of a
function is defined as [27]
f
′′
(x) =


Convex :> 0
Concave :< 0
Affine := 0.
Thus we have from (21) that
f
′′
1 (Pa) = −
(
hb
1 + hbPa
)2
.
We then show the convexity of the f2(Pa) using the princi-
ple that the nonnegative weighted-sum of a convex (concave)
10
function is a convex (concave) [27, Section 3.2.1]. The second
part can be rewritten as∫ hb[n]
0
e−
he[n]
ye
Pa[n]
1 + he[n]Pa[n]
dhe
≡
∫ hb[n]
0
w(he)f(Pa, he)dhe.
It has been shown in [27] that if f(Pa, he) is convex (concave),
then f2(Pa) is convex (concave). Thus, we have that the
second derivative of f2(Pa) as
f
′′
2 (Pa) = −
2he
(1 + hePa)
.
Thus both parts of (21) are concave functions independently
under the constraint of hb ≥ 0 and Pa ≥ 0. These are the
positive semi-definite constraints that guarantees communica-
tion between the source and the destination. If hb < 0 and/or
Pa < 0 then no information could be transmitted successfully.
Therefore, we have that (21) is the sum of a concave and
a convex function (−f(x) = convex if f(x) = concave) in
terms of Pa.
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